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Finance, Organization, and Impacts of U.S.
Agricultural Research: Future Prospects
By Wallace Huffman
The objective ofthis paper is to review key conceptual issues inthe finance, management,
and economic impact analysis ofagricultural research of the U.S. and other western developed
countries, to critique evidence onthe impacts ofR&D, to summarize new developments and
emerging trends inagricultural science policy, and to speculate about the likely effect ofthese
trends during the 21stcentury on impacts ofR&D. The conceptual review emphasizes refinements
in the theory of publicgoodsassociated with a class of impure publicgoods. Some overall
conclusions are presented for U.S. agricultural research policy of the 21st century.
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Finance, Organization, and Impacts of U.S.
Agricultural Research: Future Prospects
By Wallace Huf&nan
1-26-99
The objective ofthis paper is to review key conceptual issues inthe finance, management,
and economic impact analysis ofagricultural research ofthe U.S. and other western developed
countries, to critique evidence on the impacts ofR&D, to summarize new developments and
emerging trends in agricultural science policy, and to speculate about the likely effect ofthese
trends during the 21st century onimpacts ofR&D. The conceptual review will emphasize
refinements inthetheory ofpublic goods associated with a class of impure public goods. Some
overall conclusions will be presented forU.S. agricultural research policyof the 21st century.
Conceptual Issues
Thetheory of public goods is central to ourunderstanding of the economics of financing
and organizing agricultural research. Some agricultural research produces pure public goods,
meaning that innovations arenonrival (being indivisible) and nonexcludable (being costly to
selective withholding). For example, the scientific discovery by JamesWatson andFrancis
Crick in 1953 ofthe structure ofDNA and suggestion ofhow it replicates created a pure
(multinational) public good. Once theirfindings were published, access to theknowledge was
unlimited. Because the discovery was of the nature of an abstract concept and not embodied in a
particularproduct, material, or process it was not patentable. Given the discovery that a gene
was a specific sequence ofbases (proteins) in DNA, other scientists were then able to envision
the growth and functioning oforganisms as programmed by functional base sequences.
2Much agricultural research, however, produces impure public goods which are partially
excludable. Access to benefitsof research mayhavea geographical dimension, (e.g.. local,
regional, national, or international), usefulness may be limited to particular plant oranimal
species, or strong intellectual property rights, e.g., patents, trade secrets, breeders' rights, may be
politically, economically, and legally feasible giving owners sole right to control or license an
innovation's use for a fixed period. Forexample, theU.S. patent system nowgives an inventor
the rightto control the useof his/her discovery for 20 years.
Some examples illustrate partial excludability ofbenefits for scientific iimovations. First,
consider the public applied agricultural research at Kansas State University that led toa new hard
red winter wheat variety in 1995 that was uniquely adapted to Kansas growing conditions and
widely adopted by Kansas farmers in 1996 and 1997. Because the wheat variety is self-
poUinated, farmers can save their own seed for replanting the following year. This use of
so-called "bin-run" seed greatly reduces private sector interest in wheat varietal development.^
Benefits ofthe research spilled across state boundaries inthe sense that the new variety also
replaced some acreage ofolder hard red winter wheat varieties in the surrounding states of
Oklahoma, Colorado, and Nebraska, but in other states, the new variety was either not good
enough todislodge older varieties orhard red winter wheat isnot grown.
Second, the discovery of the structure ofDNA enabled later discoveries, some ofwhich
were patentable and generated large licensing revenue and new companies. That is, an
intellectual property right system can be used to make excludability economically feasible and to
convert discoveries into impure public goods that are marketable. For example, the discovery by
Cohen and Boyer in 1973 ofthe basic technique for recombinant DNA, the splicing ofgenes
3possibly from different species, was both adiscovery ofamethod and aproduct. The Cohen-
Boyer patent on the basic technique ofgene-splicing was awarded in 1980 to Stanford University
and the University ofCalifornia and launched the new field ofgenetic engineering (Office
ofTechnology Assessment 1989). Boyer then became a cofounder oftheprivate company
Genentech about 1980 inaneffort to exploit commercial possibilities ofgenetic engineering.^
Third, Monsanto discovered and patented aRoundup Ready technology for soybeans in
1995. AU.S. patent limits theuse ofthis technology for 20years, and Monsanto charges a
technology fee of$5 per acre (initially) for the use ofRoundup Ready technology embedded in
soybean varieties. The technology changes weed management from several applications of
several active ingredients peryearto a single application of one broad-spectrum herbicide. The
average reduction inweed control cost, including theadded cost of thetechnology fee, has been
about $10 peracre'(Carlson, Marra, andHubbell 1997). Roundup Ready soybeans allow farmers
to plantin narrow rows or drill seeds, which reduces soilerosion overwide-row planting and
crowds out some weeds. Farmers, however, must forego saving and using their own soybean
seedfrom Roundup Readyvarieties. Monsanto has found it profitable to priceRoundup Ready
technology to achievewidespreadadoptionby soybean producers, and this allows farmers and ,
consumers of soybeanproducts to share in the benefits of the new technology. Over the long
term scientist will be able to innovate around Monsanto's patent and the life of the patent is
limited. Hence, the benefits from the Roundup Ready technology for soybeans is only partially
appropriable to Monsanto or partially excludable, r . .
Because of limited potential appropriability ofdiscoveries that are of a pure public good
nature, e.g., the discovery of the structure ofDNA, the private sectorwill grossly underfund this
4type of research relative to the social optimum or not finance it at all (Huf&nan and Just 1999;
Comes and Sandier 1996). Hence, the public sector can be expected to play a major role in
financing fundamental discoveries that are of a pure public good nature. More applied and
product/design or process/method oriented discoveries that the fundamental discoveries enable
have higher expected appropriability through patenting, and the private sector can be expected to
finance a major share of them, e.g., the development of bt cotton and com, Round Up Ready
Soybeans, bGH ofbSt for dairy cows. Advances in technology, however, sometimes lead to
advances in science to resolve unanticipated outcomes.
Positive extemalities or spillovers are common with research and other public goods,
and they fi-equently are a source of socially inefficient decisions on optimal provision. When a
public good, say a scientific innovation, provides benefits outside the political jurisdiction that
finances/provides it, and no compensation is paid by outsiders, positive extemalities in the form
of spillovers occur. Spillovers occur when the "economic jurisdiction" or impact area is larger
than the political boundaries or the financing jurisdiction. For agricultural research (and other
public goods), it is important to distinguish between "political or deciding" and "economic or
benefitting" jurisdictions (Comes and Sandier 1996; Olson 1969,1986). Serious social
inefficiency arises in the form ofunderinvestment either when an economic jurisdiction is
broader than the political jurisdiction (as above) in both examples or when the economic
jurisdiction is a small subpart of a larger political jurisdiction and provision ofresearch funds,
e.g., is by collective action (Olson 1969,1986), i.e., a local public good.
As illustrated by the above review, finance and conduct of agricultural research can be
administeredby the same or separate institutions, e.g., can be done "in-house" or "contracted
5out." With public (orprivate) financing, research can beundertaken by either public orprivate
enterprises. Mechanisms for allocating research funds among agents/institutions include
competitive grants based on researchproposals, research contracts, formula/block grant
allocations, or other collaborative arrangements; The institutionalmechanism for bringing
financial resources and the scientific enterprise together differ between the public and private
sectors.
Private firms typically finance and invest in research when they can expect to increase
their own profits, especially though the development ofnew commercial products, materials, and
processes, i.e., use innovations for strategic purposes. For research to be potentially profitable
for the private sector, innovations must be ofa type that can be protected by intellectual property
rights, e.g., patents, breeders rights, trade secrets, or copyrights (Huffman,^d Just 1999; a Office
ofTechnology assessment 1989; Wright 1983). For example, Zucker and Darby (1997)
discuss research adjustments and changes in the pharmaceutical industry resulting from the
biotechnoldgy revolution. They find that firms have little incentive .to promote the "public
interest." Much agricultural research, however, is not easily protected by intellectual property
rights, or if it is, the expected retum is too low to interest the private sector. Thus, society will be
better off if the public sector imdertakes basic research and correctly identifies and subsidizes i
agricultural research that produces socially valuable impure public goods that are not produced
by the private sector optimally.
Some scientific discoveries have beneficiaries that are not defined geographically, and
Olson (1986) suggests calling them the"clientele" and Comes andSandier (1996) suggest
calling thema "club." Withpublicagricultural research funded by collective action, scattered
6research cHentele (or clubmembers) increases greatly the cost of organizing to finance
agricultural research, and as the number ofmembers inthe clientele group or club grows, the
free- oreasy-rider problem generally causes the group to lose it power and to become political
ineffective (Olson 1965; Comes and Sandier 1996). Forthese clientele groups to bepolitically
effective, they must solve the free-rider problem.
One effectivemeansof solvingthis problem is to obtainfederal legislation requiring
participation of target-group members. In the United States, the 1985 farm bill permitted
agricultural commodity groups tohold a referendum for coverage by mandatory commodity
check-offprograms to finance commodity promotion and agricultural research. Acommodity
group is then designated tomanage the check-off funds, e.g, theNational Pork Council, the
National Com Growers Association, National Soybean Association, National Cattlemen's
Association. In Canada and the United Kingdom,national legislationhas also enabled producer
commodity councils to funding research and other activities (Huffman and Just 1998b; Guitard
1985; Smith 1996; Thirtle et. al 1997).
Private interest group financing ofpublic agricultural research is socially efficient if
(1) all of the beneficiaries of the research are included in the "group" and (2) the private
financing does not adversely affect (i.e., crowd out) the amount ofpublic resources allocated to
other socially worthwhile agricultural research. Unfortunately, one orboth ofthese conditions
are seldom met. First, the (potential) beneficiaries of agricultural research are generally much
larger than any particular commodity group (or corporation). Notably over the long-run, a large
share ofthebenefits ofpublic agricultural research goes to consumers (see Alston and Pardey
1996, Ch. 5). In contrast tothe broad distributional benefits associated with public research, a
7large share (but notall) ofthebenefits ofprivate sector agricultural research goes to the
companies financing andconducting theresearch.(Huf&nan and Evenson 1993). Second,
research as a production process has a large amount of ex ante uncertainty and public institutions
that are under financial distress frequently look favorably on almost any outside sourceof
funding. Thus, a private group is frequently able to contract with a public research institute to
undertake a project for less than the expected cost which creates joint public-private financing.
Hence, public funds that would otherwise have gone to other public agricultural research projects
having greater public goods content are redirected by the joint venture.
From a public interest perspective, the key issue is the size of the social payoff for the
joint public-private venture versus purely publicly financed projects which are foregone by the
redirection ofpublic resources to the joint venture project. If the social opportunity cost is low,
then the redirection is socially good, but if the opportunity cost is high, society is worse offby
these joint public-private ventures than if no private fimding of public agricultural research
occurred. See Ulrick, Furtan, and Schmitz (1986) for adverse effects ofprivate funding ofbarley
research, and Huffman and Just (1994) for adverse effects of federal grant, contract and
cooperative agreement funding of public agricultural research on state agricultural total factor
productivity. The displacement ofpublic goods research by private or quasi-private goods
researchcan be a significant"crowing out" effect that canundermine the willingnessof •
taxpayers to support public goods research.
Critique of Economic Impacts of R&D
Manytypes of evaluations of publicresearch (andextension) programs exist. Some
countproducts produced or producers contacted, but economic impactanalysis of a
8program/project attempts to associate benefits produced with economic cost. This means
computing an internal rate ofreturn, benefit-cost-ratio, or present value of benefits net of cost.
Economic impact evaluations include ex ante evaluations (undertaken before the project or
program is initiated) or expost evaluations (undertaken after the project or program is initiated)
or perhaps after it is complete. This critique focuses on expost evaluations.
Much of the work on economic evaluation of research (and extension) has focused on
the more difficult issue ofobtaining estimates of the benefits. The two most common methods
employed are analytical measures of producer and consumer surplus and econometric estimates
of productivity or product functions.
Evenson (1998) summarizes the evidence from about 260 studies of all types containing
an economic evaluation of benefit-cost of agricultural research. He reports that the median real
intemal-rate-of-retum is 40 percent. Given that the real rate of return on a relatively riskless
short-term Treasury Bill has historically been less than 2 percent, a 40 percent real rate of return
is extremely large even after making some adjustment for riskiness ofresearch investments. TTie
distribution of intemal-rate-of-retums is similar for difference evaluation procedures, and there is
no evidence of any change in the intemal-rate-of-retum before and after 1985.
One check on the validity of estimates is to see if they are consistent with observed
growth rate experience for agriculture. Suppose the investment rate in agricultural research is
one percent of output and research has a trapezoidal-shaped distribution of impacts over time
on agricultural output/productivity, then an intemal-rate-of-retum of 60 percent is possible with
total factor productivity growth rates in the 1.5-2.5 range. For U .S. agriculture the latest USDA
estimates of total factor productivity growth rate for 1948-1994 is 1.9 percent (Ball, Bureau,
9Nehring, and Somwam 1997), and for most western developed countries, the TFP growth rate
falls in the range of 1.5-2.5 percent per year since 1973-89 (OECD 1995).
Some important me^urement issue in TFP analysis remain. First, both positive and
negative externalities associated with research undertaken at aparticular location may -be
imperfectly measured or-ignored. For example, research conducted at one location frequently
imperfectly impacts producers/consumers in other locations. New technology sometimes
degrade the local enviroimient (e.g., extensive field cultivation before planting) and others
enhance the local environment (e.g., no-till farming greatly reduces soilandwater erosion and
enhances wildlife habitat). Second, withcorrelated variables, exclusion of relevant variables
(e.g., private R&D) leads potentially tobiased estimates ofthe contribution ofmcluded
explanatory variables. Furthermore, even.when allrelevant variables are included inan
econometric analysis,,muhicollinarity makes it difficult to. identify accurately the contribution
of separate explanatory variables. Third, assumed distribution ofR&D benefits overtime is
important to research benefitevaluation, but given.the current stateof knowledge and the data
available, I believe that there is little to be leamed from fiirther examination ofthis issue. I will
return to this topic later.
Researchhas other potentially important impacts beyondthose revealed in benefit
cost analysis. For example, research has been shown to have an effect on the optimal (profit
maximizing) composition of inputs and outputs in production and more generally on the structure
of agriculture. Huffman and Evenson (1989) showed, using state aggregate data for U.S. cash
grain farms, that public and private crop research rotates the profit ftmction so as to bias input
use in favor offertilizer and against farm labor and machinery inputs. Public research also
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biased theoutput composition of cash grain fanns toward soybeans (relative to feed grains and
wheat). In contrast, private agricultural research biased the output composition toward feed
grains. U.S. agriculture has also been adjusting toeconomy-wide market forces and changes in
the government farm commodity programs.
In a laterstudy, Huffinan andEvenson (1999) identify econometrically the contribution
ofpublic technology policies (public research and extension and farmers' schooling), economy-
wide market forces (private R&D andprices for fertilizer, machinery input, farm labor and non-
farm labor), and government farm commodity programs to structural adjustment in U.S.
agriculture (specialization, farm size, and part-time farming), and of structural adjustments to
growth ofproductivity. The study shows that part oftotal factor productivity change inU.S.
agriculture has been channeled through structural change, but more important to this paper is its
implications about the impact of public technology policy on structural change.
They simulate the counter-factual scenario ofholding public technology policy constant
at its initial (or 1950) value andcomputing the difference it would have made on structural
adjustment in U.S. agriculture over the study period. They show that actual public technology
policy (relative to the 1950 policy) made little difference to crop specialization to the mid-1960s,
but after that date, public technology policy was a positive and increasing force to greater crop
specialization. For livestock specialization, actual public technology policy after 1972 (relative
to 1950 policy) steadily reduced livestock specialization (up to 1982), but before 1972, it
sometimes made a negative difference and sometimes a positive difference. Actual public
technology policy (relative to 1950 policy) has made apositive and generally increasing
difference to farm sizeoverthestudy period. Perhaps surprising, since themid-1950s actual
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public technology policy (relative to the 1950 policy) seems tohave reduced the odds ofoff-farm
work participation of farmers. Overall, they conclude that if publicR&D (andeducation)
policies had been unchanged at their 1950values for the study period, major structural change
would have occurred anyway in U.S. agriculture because of impacts of private R&D and market
forces.
New Developments in Agricultural Science Policy and Emerging Trends
First, I discuss new developments in agricultural research policies in the United States
and in other western developed countries.^ Second, I suggest emerging trends for the 21st
century.
New Developments in Agricultural Science Policy
Three new development are identified and discussed briefly (also see Huffman and Just
1999b).
Development 1\ The rate of growth of public agricultural research expenditures has been
reduced significantly. During 1971-1981, the annual (compound) average growth rate of real
agricultural research expenditures for these 18westerndeveloped countries was a relatively large
2.9 percent, 3.2 percent for the Western European countries and 2.6 percent for the North
American countries (table 1). For all of the countries except Germany, the growth rate was
positive. During 1981-1993, the growth rate forpublic agricultural research expenditures,
however, was significantly lowerby about 1 percentage point — 1.9percentfor all 18coimtries,
2.2 percent for the WesternEuropeancountries, and 1.9percent for theNorth American
coimtries. During this latter period, three countries (Belgium, Greece, and Ireland) had negative
growth in agricultural research expenditure, the U.K. had no netgrowth, and Canada had an
12
average growth rate of only 0.26 percent. Over the two combined periods, Germany has almost
no net growth in public agricultural research expenditures.
Development 2\ Traditional national (or central) government funding sources for
agricultural research are reducing systematic funding, including formula or program
funding, and increasing emphasis on centrally controlled competitive grant programs. This
new direction is especially apparent in the United Kingdom and less in the United States and
Germany. During 1972-1982, most of the U.K. public agricultural research funds were allocated
noncompetitivelyby the Ministry of Agriculture, Food, and Fisheries on a program basis
(Thirtle, et al 1997). The latest major redirection ofU.K. public agricultural research started in
1982. As a result, some applied research institutions were sold to the private sector. The
national government cut ear-marked or program funding for institutes and laboratories that were
engaged in "near market" and "agricultural productivity enhancing" research and increased
funding for the Higher Education Institutes (HEI) and the Biotechnology and Biological Science
Research Institute (BBSRI). The latter two institutes primarily operate competitive grants
programs in "basic science"and in "public interest" research focused on food safetyand
enviroimiental issues. Scientists from a broad set of institutions are eligible to bid on HEI and
BBSRI projects. In 1993/94, competitive grant funds for agricultural research increased to 20
percent of public funds allocated to agricultural research (but 80 percentcontinue to be allocated
as program fundsor block grants to agricultural research institutions). SeeThirtle et al 1997.
In the U.S., the composition ofthe "regular federal" funding (i.e., Cooperative States
Research Service, CSRS, or Cooperative StatesResearch,Education, and Extension Service,
ESREES) and mechanism for allocating federal funds to the state agricultural experiment station
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system (and other cooperating state institutions) have changed. In 1887, when the SAES, system •
was first given formal national government funding by passage ofthe Hatch Act, approximately
82 percent of thefimdingfor theSAES systemwere from regular/federal,funds. This share
trended downward to 65percent in 1900, 22percent in 1960, and 14percent m 1990 butwere
larger in 1995 (15 percent). The exact mechanism for distributing "regular federal" funds has
changed overtime (Huf&nan andEvenson 1993, pp. 21-23; Alston andPardey 1996, Ch.2;
Committee on the Future of the LandGrantUniversity System1995,Ch. 6; Fuglie et. al. 1996).
Historically a legislated formula for allocating federal appropriations to the SAES system has
been central to national governmentfunding of publicagricultural research. Initially everystate
received an equal sized national government,appropriation, but over the period 1935-55, the
formula was modified to also depend on a state's share of total U.S. farm population and total
U.S. rural people. After strong encouragement from the National Research Council, the USDA.
initiated a Competitive Grants Programs in 1977. Its fiinding increased substantially beginning
with the National Research Initiative (NRI) in 1986. The NRI competition is open to all public .
and private researchers.
In 1900, virtually all of the 64 percent of SAES funding from the national government
came from USDA formula/program funds.(Huffinan and Evenson 1993)^ but in 1980 the share
from Hatch, Regional, and non-grant funds was 56 percent and in 1996 only 32 percent
(Huffing and Just 1999a). In 1982, about 3.3 percent of regular federal fundsfor SAES were
distributed by competitive grants, but this share increased to 8.6 percent in 1990 and 16.6percent
in 1996 (Huffman,and Evenson 1993,Huffman and Just 1999a). Hence, "regular federal" funds
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for agricultural research are being allocated increasingly by competitive grants and less by
formula or block grants to state (see also Buttel this volume).
Development 3\ Public agricultural research scientists are being encouraged topursue
nontraditional sources of funding such as outside departments (ministers) of agriculture in
national governments, private corporations, producer(commodity or cooperative) groups.
The trend is strongest intheUnited Kingdom, the U.S., France, theNetheriands, and Canada.
In the United Kingdom, therecent redirection ofagricultural research funds away from the
Ministry ofAgriculture, Food, and Fisheries to the Higher Education Institutes and establishment
ofnewstatutory bodies (commodity groups) to fiind agricultural research represents a new
emphasis onnontraditional agricultural research funding (Smith 1996; Thirtle, et. al. 1997).
In 1993/94, the HEX funds represented 15 percent ofexpenditures onU.K. public agricultural
research, which wasconsiderably larger than the5.5 percent share in 1987/88.
In the U.S. at both the state and federal level, nontraditional sources ofresources and
technology transfer have been developed recently. Over the past two decades, SAES scientists in
theU.S. have turned increasingly to "non-regular federal" and private sector sources. In 1960,
the share of SAES system fimding coming from nontraditional federal government sources was
7.6 percent, and ithas grown--l 1percent in 1980,12 percent in 1990, and 15 percent in 1995
(see Huffman and Evenson 1993, USDA 1996). These funds were distributed by the USDA in
contracts and cooperative agreements and bythe National Institutes ofHealth, theU.S. Agency
for International Development, the National Science Foundation, the U.S. Department ofHealth
and Human Services, thePublic Health Service, and other agencies primarily by competitive
grants.
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During thepastdecade, U.S. federal laboratories have greatly increased the amount of
collaborative research with the private sector. The 1986 Technology Transfer Act established a
mechanism, a CRADA,,through which federal and non-federal researchers could collaborate
(Fuglie et al. 1996, p. 55). Thislegislation permits federal laboratory to enter into CRADA's
withuniversities, private companies, non-federal government entities, and others. The principle
objective of a CRADA,however, is to link the pretechnology researchcapacityof federal
laboratories with the commercial research and marketing expertise of the private sector. Under
a CRADA, a federal laboratory may provide personnel, equipment, and laboratory privileges. A
collaborator with a federal laboratory may contribute funds directly to a federal laboratory and
the cooperating institution receives the rights of first refusal to any joint discovery and may be
given exclusive access to data from ajoint project (Fuglie et. al. 1996, p.56). CRADA activity
has increased rapidly after 1987, but the private sector CRADA resources are less than 1 percent
of the budget of the Agricultural Research Service of the USDA (Huf&nan and Just 1999b).
In France, the growth of systematic/program funding for research in national institutes
has not been fast enough to cover the cost ofexperimentation. Scientists are now encouraged to
undertake cooperative or joint venture projects with public (regional governmental) and private
sector partners. In the Netherlands, there has been a large increase in the number ofpublic-
privatepartnershipsfor agricultural research, including the private sector investing significantly
in resources ofthepublic institutions. In Italy, fimding ofpublic agricultural research bythe
National Research Council, Ministry of Industry and Trade, and Ministry ofResearch and
Universities represent nontraditional sources (Huffman and Just 1999b).
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InCanada, since theearly 1980s, commodity, producer, processor, and trade associations
have been collecting funds for financing agricultural research. These groups include the
Canadian Horticultural Council, theCanola Council of Canada, theBrewing andMalting Barley
Research Institute, and the Canadian andWestern Grains Councils (Guitard 1985). However, a
new agricultural research policy was established in 1994, the Matching Investment Initiative
(Mil). Under this program, the federal government matches up to dollar-for-dollar the private
sector's contributions tojoint research ventures. TheMilwas implemented bythe federal
government to offset declmes in federal funding for agricultural research. Also, new fimds for
public research are coming from commodity check-offprograms for wheat, barley, and beef
Although there is clearly increased emphasis on obtaining private sector funding for
public agricultural research institutions, the share ofthe total funds that these institutions
research from the private sector is small. Among the western developed countries, the U.S.
receives the largest share ofprivate sector funding ofpublic agricultural research, 7.5 percent in
1960, 9.2 percent in1980, and 14.3 percent in 1996 (Huffman and Just 1999a,b). Private sector
funding ofresearch in public institutions raises anumber ofpolitical-economic issues that do not
appear inprivate sector funding ofits own activities.
Emerging Trends for the 21st Century
Based on consideration of factors introduced earlier in the paper, emerging trends in
financing, organization, and management ofresearch are now identified.
New Organizations. New political jurisdictions will be formed to finance particular types
of agricultural research in the public sector, strengthening of IPRs to increase the breadth of
17
R&D activities undertaken by the private sectorwill occur, and public research will become
increasingly concentrated in general/basic and pretechnologyresearch areas.
First, new political jurisdictions will be formed for the purpose of financing agricultural
researchproducing impure public goodsbenefitting primarily the jurisdiction. This will become
an importantnew funding source for public researchinstitutions. Thesejurisdictionswill include
new alliances across countries and subregions within large countries. Small countries will look
actively for potential alliances with other, especially larger coimtries, that they can join. They
are too small to capture significant benefits from pretechnology and general science research
supporting agriculture. Furthermore, they will increasingly see that it is-to then* long term
advantage to open markets so that they can benefit from the technically advances made in other
countries. Within large coimtries, a mosaic ofoverlapping political jurisdictions may develop;
they have worked well for the provision ofmany other local public goods and services, .e.g.,
education, water control districts.
Second, intellectual property rights will be further strengthened to increase the share of
total agricultural research, e.g., in biotechnology and new information systems, that is financed
and conducted in the private sector. Drawing upon a recently published patent rights index for
111 countries over 1960-1990, Table 1 shows the patent rights index ofthe U.S. (and other
western developedcountries) strengthened moverapidlyafter 1975.'' Given that the upper limit
of the indexis 5, the table showsthat there is potential for further strengthening the patentrights
index in theU.S. (and otherwestern developed.countries). This would make it possible forthe
private sector to provide more of its own research needs, and we believe that this is the best
direction for the private sector to channel resources, for research.
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Third, private sector financing ofagricultural research will notgrow in importance asa
funding source for public institutions inwestern developed countries. During the21st century,
it will becomeclear that joint public-private sectorfmancing of joint-ventures research venture
may look like good opportunities, butthey actually come athigh social cost due to crowding out
other socially preferred projects. The private interests of companies and commodity groups are
seldom well aligned withthesocial good orpublic interest and few companies and clubs are
willing tomake unrestricted research grants topublic research institutions orscientists as Revlon
has supported cancer research over the past decade atUCLA Medical School. This creates a
major conflict with the interests oftaxpayers that provide amajority ofthe support ofpublic
agricultural research institutions. Furthermore, because we see no evidence that public
agricultural research fimds are allocated so astoequalize expected marginal returns, joint
public-private ventures come ata high opportunity cost when they redirect public fimds to
areas that have a lower social rates of return, or crowd out other socially worthwhile projects.
Asthe stock of knowledge hasgrown and intellectual property rights to scientific
discoveries have been strengthened, the division of labor between research undertaken bythe
public and private sector has shifted. The private sector now finds itprofitable to undertake
an increasing share ofthe applied and pretechnology research but seldom toimdertake research
on basicscientific discoveries. Thus, the public sector has largely withdrawn from direct
competition with the private sector in applied research. The result is that the public sector is
allocating an increasing share ofits research to discoveries inbasic and pretechnology sciences.
Some areas ofapplied research, however, remain privately unprofitable, e.g., research on
environmental and natural resource quality, food safety and human nutrition, agricultural policy.
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and minor crops. Thus, there continues to bea need for selective applied research by thepublic
sector in socially worthwhile ^eas.
Overall, the national agricultural R&D. systems of"large countries" that have developed
as a system of shared publicandprivatefinance andperformance of agricultural research andthe
public component is decentralized between the iiation and state/provincial governments, e.g., the
United States and Germany, are best positioned for meeting the R&D needs of their residents in
the 21st century. These systems are better positioned for financing and .conducting agricultural
research to meet the changing demand for local or impure public goods than the national
financed, administered, and conducted systems, e.g., France. The decentralized systems are large
enough to obtain many of the benefits firom basic or pretechnology research. Small countries
must strive to improve their access to new technological innovations by forming new political
alliances with other countries, being open to technology transfer, and to imports of technically
enhanced goods. See Huffinan and Just 1999b for further discussion and rationale.
As we conceptualize the structure and organizationof the R&D system for agriculture for
the 21st century, a pictorial representationmay help to illustrate it. A linear organization of
science and technology is now widely in disfavor by the history of science profession, e.g., see
Rosenberg 1994, and never had much credibility amongthe founding fathers of the U.S. public
agricultural research system (seeHuffmanandEvenson1993). By a linear organization of
science and technology, I mean thatadvances in science lead fairly directly, although with some
lag, to advances intechnology without any feedback inthe opposite direction. The newly
accepted perspective bythehistory of science profession is that considerable knowledge is
generated at the technological fi-ontier and thatadvances in technology feedback to cause
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advances and refinements in science. Thus, the relationship is bi-directional; advances in science
lead to advances in technology, butadvances in technology also lead to advances in science. In
particular, because ofthe complexity ofnature, itis impossible for scientists to anticipate all of
the advances inknowledge that are required tomake new technologies commercially successful
(see Rosenberg 1994 for adiscussion ofanumber ofexamples in high technology). In
agriculture, there is a long history ofpractical problems driving the curiosity ofasignificant
share ofscientists, especially those engaged inapplied research inagricultural experiment
stations and the Agricultural Research Service (see Huffman and Evenson 1993; Huffman and
Just 1994). This occurred largely because most agricultural scientists have had agricultural roots,
and scientists andfarmers sawthe importance of feedback between them. Huffinan and Just
(1994) have shown that the upstream exposure to farmers' problems is most productive for
scientists engaged inapplied research. Furthermore, both a system ofapplied agricultural
sciences andmethods for training agricultural scientists were needed and developed during the
20th century to provide the steady source ofinnovations needed to support the modernization of
U.S. agriculture.
The organization for the new R&D system for agriculture ispresented inFigure 1.
It contains six sunultaneous, on-going layers of activity withupstream anddownstream
linkages/feedback and horizonal linkages and builds on an organization presented in Hufftnan
and Evenson 1993, p. 43. Furthermore, within the layered organization, upstream and
downstream linkages can jump over a layer and not be confined to interactions exclusively with
an adjacent layer. Level I contains the final users ofnew technology and the sources of
information about new information and technology needs and problems. Level II contains the
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information dissemination system, extension, which has linkages upstream to final user
technologies and information problems, horizontally to different types ofpotentially useful
extensioninformationfor clienteles, and downsteam to newproducts from innovations and new
information fi:om scientists engaged in applied research or technology invention. Level III
contains thecoihmercialized products from-invention. -Level FV contains applied research
leading to technology invention. Scientists working at this level have important linkages
upstream to extension and final users' information' and technology needs, horizontally to. other
applied research working on potentially related and important information for an innovation, and
downstream to pre-technology sciences formore advariced theories andmethods. Level V, pre-
technology research, is research directed specifically toward producing discoveries that enable
andassist technology inventions, and it is linked upstream for guidance aboutthe nature of
advances in knowledge that might be particularly usefuland downstream to general sciences for
the fundamental advances in knowledge and refined scientific theories. Advances in knowledge
at this level are almost exclusively abstract concepts and not new products or processes. •Level
VI contains research in basic or core sciences that is expected to lead to fundamental discoveries.
With strengthening of intellectual property rights that occurred at the end ofthe 20th
century and will continue into the 21st century, the division oflabor between research that will
be fin^ced and largely conducted by the public and private sectors will continue to shift. In
particular, as the private sector invests more heavily in a range of activities in Level IV and
occasionally in Level V, this will release resources that the public sector had been investing here
to be to deployed to Levels V and VI. This means that during the 21st century, the public sector
financed research will become increasingly concentrated in the general/core and pretechnology
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sciences andin a few applied research areas thatthepublic sector does not find profitable but are
socially worthwhile.
Management ofResearch andAllocation ofResearch Funds. Major changes are expected
during the21stcentury in themanagement ofagricultural research, thephilosophy of ftmding
institutions, and mechanisms for allocating/distributing funds. The.changes will be driven
largely bynewand emerging information about therelative economic efficiencies of different
management and funding practices, e.g., seeHuffman andJust 1998a, Levitt 1995.
Scientists employedby researchinstitutions will mcreasingly receive incentive
compensation based on thequality of their research orvalue of theresearch payoff. The
principles of optimal contractmg from principal-agent theory, incorporating ex ante imcertainty
in the researchproductionprocess, asymmetric information on scientists' effort, and payoffs
being described as the "best" of scientists' output rather thantotal output, will guide these
decisions. Theyimplythat administrators will increasingly implement a partial incentive contract
with scientists that involves both an optimal compensationguarantee and an optimal
performance incentive. The performance incentive should bedefined bythecharacteristics that
matter mvaluing theR&D payoff to theemploying institution. More basically, what matters in
valuing theR&D payoffwill most likely berooted inthe values ofthepolitical jurisdiction or
clientele financing the institution (or research). Scientists thenexertthe optimal level of effort
and the researchinstitutionmaximizes its expected R&D payoff net of the wage bill for
scientists. See Huffinan and Just (1998a) for greater details and discussion.
Emerging trends in thetransfer ofresources from research-financing institutions to
research-performing institutions and scientists will show a resurgence inprogram and
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institutional funding, rapid growth and popularity of quality-based incentive contracts, and
reducedemphasis on peer^review competitive-grant systems. With quality-based incentive
contracting in place between research administrators and scientists, program, instimtional, and
formula funding of research will again be seen as a relatively efficient mechanism for funding
agricultural research.
Quality-based incentive contracting will become a relative popular mechanism for
allocation funds from newly established political jurisdictions that finance research to research
performing institutions and scientists. Principal-agent theory and incentive contracting for
research implies that optimal contracts have a quality-based (and not a cost-based) incentive.
Contracts for research where quality ofoutput is ofupmost importance should not include cost
incentives. Given that scientists' effort is not contractible and output is uncertain, an incentive to
cut cost unduly cuts scientists' effort and quality of the output and the value of the research
payoff. Furthermore, contracts will be increasinglydefined in terms ofbroad performance
attributes that reflect the value of the researchpayoffsto the funding institutionsor financing
jurisdiction rather than specifications of a particular innovation. This added breadth can be
expected to reduce riskiness of projects to scientists and induce increased research effort
(HufBnanand Just 1998a). •
Peer-review competitive granting systems will lose theirglamor during the21stcentury
as the imperfections and inefficiencies inthis type of.research contract become more widely
known. Although peer-rreviewed competitive grant programs are popular with theNational
Science Foundation and National Institutes ofHealth, they have important imperfections and
deficiencies as a research contract. -The problems are associated with ex aw/e uncertainty ofthe
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research production process and asymmetric information on scientists' effort and ability (see
Huffman and Just 1998; 1999a). For example, a research proposal has little direct value in the
R&D payoffof a project, but a peer-reviewed grant system places the quality incentive on the
research proposal rather than the actual discovery. The research output is observed only after the
award is given and its quality is imperfectly correlated with the proposal quality.
Additional problems arise from the heavy externalities that federal competitive grants
programs imposeon scientistsand their institutions. The externalities are becauseof a systemin
which the federal funding agencies do not explicitly finance all of scientists' time. If scientists
receive no compensation for proposal writing or are compensated only for successful proposals,
the incentive is to write proposals for work that has already been completed or to write proposals
that appear attractive but commit little. The resources required for unsuccessful proposals must
be covered by the scientists' institutions possibly at high opportunity costs in terms of teaching
time or reduced research output from other research fimds. The proposal evaluation and ranking
process also consume scientists' time that is not compensated by granting agencies. The low
overhead rate, e.g., 19 percent upper limit on National Research Initiative grants through 1998
and 14percent starting in 1999,is a deterrent to grantparticipation by some institutions.
Finally, because of their small numbers, the standardsof reviewers and review panels are
more narrow, conservative, and/or possibly short-sighted than the broad scientific community on
acceptable research methods andpotentially attainable discoveries. Thus, the"peerpanels" tend
to impose homogeneity of approaches (which reduces thediversity of sampling) or to require
preliminary research evidence (which retards theresearch process). A socially desirable national
research fimding mechanism forbasic and pretechnology science should notunload the riskiness
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of scientific discovery onto institutions or funding mechanisms thathave relatively higher risk
premiums. Many of these issues areaddressed in a recent General Accounting Office report
(U.S. GAO). These are problems that couldpotentially be mitigatedin the federal peer-reviewed
competitive grant programs.
Given that research discoveries are uncertain, duplicative research efforts by scientists
working independently have merit. With asymmetric information about the research production
process, the value of the information effect from scientistsworking independently on the "same
project" is strengthened by similarity (correlation)ofresearch output. However, the information
effect is only ofvalue as it is incorporated into scientists incentive schemes that induce more
effort and higher quality research. During the 21st century, this information will be increasingly
used by administrators in setting incentives for scientists. Given the decentralized organization
of agricultural research in the United States (see Huffinan and Just 1998), sufficient duplication
of objectives among research projects conducted across the country seems to exists so that the
information value of duplication is low compared to the sampling value. If so, then the
inducement of similarity in research efforts through competitive funding has a detrimental effect
when the ultimate social payoffdepends on the best rather than the total quantity of scientists'
output.
Giventhe principles developedin Huffman andJust 1998,agricultural sciencepolicy
during the21stcentury will increasingly recognize thesocial efficiency of funding public
agricultural research through formula and program fimding ofdiverse research institutions that
offer optimal incentives tothe scientists they employ. Short research proposals (e.g., a few pages
inlength) covering reasonably long periods oftime (e.g., 3-5 years), serve sufficiently to permit
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administrators to monitor, review, and manage— ifthe more crucial steps are taken to
implement optimal incentives basedonattributes of value to the institution. Research proposals
shouldstate the objectives sufficiently to allowthe administrator to verify that anticipated
payoffs fit the criteria that are used in valuing the R&D payoff of the institution. Under the new
management of agricultural research, scientists' effort andtimefor reviewing andevaluating will
beallocated exclusively to assessing the quality of research output, e.g., reviewing manuscripts
forpublication and evaluating research payoffs, andnot to research proposals.
Issues in Assessing Econometrically the
Contribution of Research to Productivity
An econometric production(or transformation) function approach to evaluatmg the
economic impact of agricultural research andextension foregoes interesting details of specific
events and focuses on identifying the relationshipbetween total output or total factor
productivity and agricultural researchand extension investments. Here productivity growth,
provided it is measuredcorrectly, is related to past investments in researchand possibly other
variables, and an attempt is made to estimate econometrically the part of total outputor total
factorproductivity growth that canbe attributed to research. The development of this
methodology has evolved over the past three decades, and Griliches has pioneered in this area. A
1979 article ofhis is especially useful for my purposes (Griliches 1979).
A Model
As a framework to fix ideas, the level and growth ofproductivity can best be discussed
from a production (or transformation) function perspective: Y=F(xi, X2,...). The fimction F()
describes the relationship between inputs and final output Y. Productivity, A=Y/X, is then
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defined asthe ratio ofoutput to some mput index Xofinputs under the control ofproducers.
Following Griliches (1979), the determinants ofproductivity can then be organized around (1)
the listof variables included inX, (2)thealgebraic form assumed forF( ), (3)theparticular
empirical observations chosen to representY and X, and (4) the econometric methods used to
infer the properties ofF() from the data. Several potentially serious problems, however, exist.
First, measurement issuesarise for bothoutputs and inputs, but, in agriculture, historically
I ,
quality changes and imperfect competition ininputs have dominated quality change and
imperfect competition in output(s). This, however, may change with new biotechnology
providing thepotential for a large increase indifferentiated agricultural outputs, e.g., protein
enhanced grain, oil enhanced/modified soybeans, pharmaceutical drugs from cowurine, etc.
Second, serious difficulties in econometric inference result from the fact thatmost of the
variables of interest tend to move together over time and possibly over space, making it
especially hardto disentangle theirseparate effects. Third, thedirection of causation orpotential
feedback in the system further complicates estimations.
To better focus on key issues, specify the production function as:
(1) Y = F(X,K,^)
where X is an index of conventional inputs, e.g., labor, capital and land inputs, K is a measure of
the current state of technical knowledge and related to current and past investments in research,
and \x represents all other xmmeasured determinants ofoutput or productivity. Now A=Y/X is
the level of total factor productivity. Furthermore, let's assume the relationship between K and
current and past research expenditures is of the general form:
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(2) K = G[W(B),R,v]
whereW() is a lag polonominal andB the backshift operator describing the relationship between
K and current and past expenditures on research,R. v is another set of unmeasured effects
affecting the transformation of research expenditures intotechnical knowledge;
(3) W(P)R = [w, +w,P + )R, = w„R +w,R., +w^R_^ +..].
A very importantset of issues associated with equation (1) and ones whichfrequently
receive too little alteration are (1) what conceptuallyshould Y, X, K, and R measure? (2) What
arethe problems [relative to (1)] with the actual measures of Y,X,K, andR available to us?
(3) Whatneeds to be assumedabout the economic and technical environment for the
relationships F( ), G( ), andW() to exist andbe stable? (4)Whatdowewant to knowabout the
relationships in (3)? Finally, hoW arewe goingto leam interesting things about the relationships
F( )j G(X W(), given imperfectdata and unmeasured effects \x and v?
In particular, many of the simplifying assumptions thatwe frequently make to
facilitate estimation have strong implications. For example, writing the production fimction
asY=F(X,K,|i) implies a single output, butmore importantly, it implies separability of
conventional inputs X from technical knowledge (or thecurrent and past research expenditures).
Writing W(B)Rt as a linear function ofpart research investments implies that therelationship
between research expenditure andtechnical knowledge is unchanging overtime, i.e., there is not
significant change in the composition of research activities or efficiency of research organization
and management.
To easily develop some further implications, lets forego a generalized form ofthe
production function, and adopt theCobb-Douglas specification:
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(4) Y =
where A' is a constant, Cis capital input, Lis labor input, Mis land input, t is trend, and a, p, y,
6, and t are unknown parameters ofinterest. Next lets assume X=C L ^M * ^where s, is
the observed factor cost share for capital input, and Sj is the factor cost share for labor input. If
/
Si and S2 are observed correctly, and factor-cost shares are proportional to the production
parameters, then Si=a/(a+P+Y), and S2= p/(a+p+Y) and no error exists incomputing input
shares, then measured total factor productivity is:
(5) A = Y/X =
Note that TFP depends not only ontechnical knowledge K, trend t inthe unmeasured factors, and
the random component |i, but also the level of conventional inputs X. Only if constant retums to
scale in conventional inputsexistsdoes a+p+Y-l=0andX drop-out of equation (5). Moreover,
anymeasurement error in oneof the conventional inputs is transmitted directly to the
productivity measure. For example, if "true" laborinputis L=qL NL, where Ql is average
"quality" perworker andN^ the total number ofworkers, thenifNl rather thanL is-used in the
construction ofX, measured productivity will be given by
(6) A'" = Y/X-' = A'(XT'P^^"'qLK^e'"*''
where X ' =C ^ .
This example helps clarify the point that much of the discussion in the literature about
why differences exist across studies of-total factor productivity misses a central point.
Differences are largely due to methods of construction, e.g., some researchers choose to
incorporate quality change of inputs into their input indexes and others do not. Too much is
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frequently made of differences in TFPmeasures across studies without looking belowthe surface
at the nature of the underlying methodology.
Technical Knowledge and Research Capital
The production ofknowledge is a complex process (see Huffinan and Evenson 1993), and
I focus on important empirical issues. We can re-write equation (2) as:
(7) K, =
where W(B)R is the lag function for past agricultural research expenditures, Xjt is the trend
component of all other factors on the state of knowledge, and u is a zero mean random
component of knowledge. Now substituting equation (7) into equation (4), obtain
(8) Y, =A*C,''LfM7[aJw(B)RJ^e^ '^
= A
where t' = Tj + Stj, t)* = 6u. W(B)R is the measureofagricultural research capital ,and
there are three major issues in measuring it.
First, agricultural research leading to commercially successful technologies for farmers is
a time consumingprocess where research expenditures today have their effects on agricultural
production later. However, onlya part of total agricultural research expenditure can be expected
to affectTFP in agriculture in any timeperiod. Thoseexpenditures that are focused on post-
harvest, marketing, agricultural policy, food safety andnutrition, family living and rural
communities are examples of onesthat canbe excluded on conceptual grounds that theydonot
produce knowledge that is expected to change the net stock oftechnical knowledge affecting the
efficiency ofconverting X into Y. Thus, we must first make a decision about the relevant subset
ofall agricultural research expenditures touse inconstructing our technical knowledge stock
T.t+V
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variable K andthenchoose a lag structure. Second, pastresearch investments depreciate and
become obsolete.^ The reasons that innovations become obsolete are that the state of knowledge
advances and new and superior irmovations replace old ones or the biological,environmental, or
economic environment changes as time passes. Empirical evidence from historical joumaland
patent citation patterns andfrom the lifecycle of successful crop varieties (Duvick 1986;
Huf&nan and Evenson 1994, Ch. ) suggest some type of distorted bell-shaped frequency ofuse
pattern. The trapezoidal shaped-lag pattern adapted byEvenson (1980), Huffman andEvenson
(1993) and others is consistentwith this distorted bell shape. Geometrically declining lag,
patterns, including infinitely long lag-lengths, however, are not consistentwith this evidence.
Furthermore, given the available data for TFP analysis, it is asking too much of the model and
data to be able to identify the lag pattern without any prior restrictions.
Third, the technical knowledge impacting agriculture in one locality is derived from its
"own research activity" but also from knowledge "borrowed" from agricultural research
conducted in other locations and possibly other industries/sectors. These are positive
externalities or research "spillovers." Intra-industry spillovers, however, cannot be examined
with national aggregate data, but they can be examined using regional or state aggregate data.
Becausemuch of agricultural research is an impure public good, it makes no sense to simply
aggregate research expenditure over other states expected to impact agriculture in any given
state.. Rather, the total knowledge stock impacting TFP in state i can best be represented as:
Ki, =E , ofiWjjS 1
j
where Kj is the stockof knowledge produced in statej obtained by correctly lagingits own
current and past agricultural research expenditures. Wjj isthe "weighting" or"distance" function,
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and it can be interpreted as the effective fraction of knowledge in state j that is borrowed by state
i. It seems reasonable that Wy beconie smaller asthe "distance" or"dissimilarity Of agriculture"
between i andj increases. Thus,we needan additional spatial-lag distribution to construct the
stock ofborrowed knowledge. For example,Huffman and Evenson (1993) use a geoclimatic
regionmap as a tool for constructing spatialweights. Othermethodsalso exist, but as with
identifying time-lagdistributions, the available data andmodels cannotbe expectedto identify
spatial lag patterns without some type ofprior restrictions.
Thus, creating the knowledge variable on research stock requires three decisions;
(1) choose the relevant expenditures (in each state) that can reasonably be expected to impact
TFP, (2) choose the length and shape of the time lag distribution, and (3) choose the spatial lag
distributions?
Other Issues
The problem of identifying the parametersof the TFPmodel is made difficult by the fact
that manyof the variablesare highly correlated or near-multicollinary. In particular, one cannot
expect to obtain definitive estimates ofthese parameters using a single cross section ofdata over
tune, i.e. using national aggregate dataovertime. However, byusing stateaggregate data, we
can obtain much wider variation in the past experiences, and the cross-sectional variation that
exists from pooling datafor40 or48 states into a panel is a major asset in trying to identify the
parameters oftheTFP model. However, prior information about time and spatial lag patterns are
still essential.
With the changes in theorganization and management of agricultural research thathave
been predicted to ernerge inthe 21st century, our life becomes increasingly difficult for
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conducting good econometric examinations ofthe contributions ofresearch to TFP. First, the
private sector isexpected to carry a larger share ofthe total investment in agricultural research.
As IPRs are strengthened, theprivate sector undertakes research somewhat similar mnature to
what thepublic sector conducted inthe past. Thus, the composition ofprivate research will
I j •
change, and it will become increasingly important to include a private agricultural research
variable in econometric TFP analysis.
Second, the composition of public agricultural research will change—less applied
researchbecauseof the larger role beingplayedby the private sector and more pre-technology
andgeneral/basic science research. Hence, it willbecome impossible to defend the assumption
that totalpublic agricultural research expenditures arehomogenous overtime as needed for the
technology knowledge variable. More attention to disaggregation, e.g., into applied and
pretechnology science research, and constnictionof public agricultural research stock indexes
will be required.
Third, public agricultural research ftinding and management methods have been changing
since about 1980, and they are expected to evolve in a different direction during the 21st century.
Hence, these changes are expected to add an additional dimension ofheterogeneity to the public
agricultural research expenditures in the 21st century. They further complicate the construction
ofmeaningful and relatively measurement-error free measures of the relevant technical
knowledge or research stock variables for explaining TFP in agriculture.
Finally, given the difficult task that we face in conducting econometric TFP analyses, we
shouldbe humble in our claims ofaccomplishments. They are at best onlly rough indicators of
f' ' •
impacts and grow in credibility as similar evidence accumulates.
34
Conclusions
This paper has reviewed a number of issues in the finance, organization, and impact
analysis of agricultural research. Here I highlight implications for the 21st century. I believe
that the economics of agricultural research fmancing and impact analysis will draw heavily upon
refinements in the theory of public goods dealing with impure public goods. Public agricultural
research will continue to be financed primarily by taxing payers ofpolitical jurisdictions, i.e.,
the national and state governments, but also new political jurisdictions established solely for
collecting and distributing funds for research. Private sector financing ofpublic research
institutions will not increase because ofmajor conflicts in missions and goals. Intellectual
property rights will be gradually strengthenedand an increasing share of total agricultural
research in the U.S. will be financed and conducted by the private sector.
The returns to investing in public agricultural research will continue to be large and
shown to be large. Research on research interests will focus on trying to identify the impacts of
differentmajor components ofpublic agriculturalresearch, e.g., applied versus pretechnology, to
incorporate interregional andperhaps intem-industry spillovers. A majoreffortwill also go into
constructing goodprivate sector agricultural research variables, to incorporating themintofuture
TFPanalyses, and to examining the potential interactions between private research, public
research, and extension. The large investment that has beenmade in constructing good measures
of stateTFPwill prove to be a rich area for pursuing these investigations becausestate data
provide a much widerrangeof experiences thannational aggregate data.
Public agricultural research expenditures will grow, fimded largely by expenditures from
new political jurisdictions. Astheprivate sector increases itsshare ofthetotal investment m
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U.S. agricultural research and invests largely inapplied research, thepublic sector will pull out
of all areaswhere it is in directcompetition withthe private sector. Thiswill release funds that
will be allocated to research in basic, general and pretechnology research that is imlikely to lead
directly to marketable products and in applied areas likefood safety andnutrition,
environmental-resource quality, and policy.
During the 21st century, agricultural science policywill re-discoverthe social efficiency
of distributing a major part of federal fimds for agricultural researchto the states by formula and
programfunds. Other federal and regionalpublic fundswill increasingly be allocated to public
research institutions and scientists through quality-based incentive contracts. The social
inefficiencies ofpeer-review competitive grant programs will become widely known and
accepted, and competitive research grant programs will lose their glamor. The competitive grant
systems that remain will be redesigned to remove the large negative externalities they impose on
scientists and their institutions. In particular, these programs will increasingly pay for research
proposal writing and reviewing. Overall, I believe the 21st century will be an exciting time for
agricultural research and those interested in trying to uncover its many remaining secrets.
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Table 1. Expenditures on Public Agricultural Research and Rate of,Growth (constant





- 1971 1981 1993 1971-81 1981-93
Western Europe . ;
L49Austria 19.7 ' 23.0 27.5' 1.55
Belgiimi 31.4 47.2 36.2 . 4.08 '-2.21
Denmark 35.2 38.3 59.6 0.84 3.69
Finland 23.2 39.1 , 64.2 5.22 4.13
France 298.0 410.0 503.5 3.19 1.71
Germany' - 308.6 299.8 332.8 -0.29 0.87
Greece 23.7 49.0 31.5 7.26 -3.68
Ireland 29.7 .33,9 27.9 1.32 -1.62
Italy 68.3 188.2 360.6 10.14 5.42
Netherlands 134.7 202.1 , 226.7 4.06 0.96
Norway 32.8 58.0 105.3 5.70 4.97
Portugal 28.3 29.4 59.4 0.38 5.86
Spain 51.0 98.6 214.2 6.59 , 6.47
Sweden 57.7 81.1 138.3 3.40 ' 4.45
Swiss 34.4 36.6 50.2 0.62: 2.63
United Kingdom 274.5 371.0 370.8 3.01 -0.00
Subtotal • • 1,451.2 • 2,005.3 2,608.7 3.23 2.19
North America , ;
Canada 354.7 452.3 466.4 2.43 0.26
United States 1,235.6 1,620.4 2,054.3 2.71 1.98
Subtotal 1,590.3 ' 2,072.7 2,520.7 2.65 1.63
Total 18 countries 3,041.5 4,078.0 5,129.4 2.93 1.91
^Only for (West)Germany
Source: Huffman and Just 1999b.
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Table 2. National Indexes ofPatent Rights, 1960-1990
Country/Region 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
Western Europe
Austria 3.38 3.38 3.48 3.48 3.81 3.81 4.24
Belgium 3.05 3.38 3.38 3.38 3.38 4.05 3.90
Denmark 2.33 2.66 2.80 2.80 3.62 3.76 3.90
Finland 1.99 1.99 2.14 2.14 2.95 2.95 2.95
France 2.76 3.10 3.24 3.24 3.90 3.90 3.90
Germany 2.33 2.66 3.09 3.09 3.86 3.71 3.71
Greece 2.46 2.46 2.46 2.46 2.46 2.46 2.32
Ireland 2.23 2.56 2.99 2.99 2.99 2.99 2.99
Italy 2.99 3.32 3.32 3.46 3.71 4.05 4.05
Netherlands 2.95 3.29 3.61 3.47 4.24 4.24 4.24
Norway 2.66 2.66 2.80 2.80 3.29 3.29 3.29
Portugal 1.98 1.98 1.98 1.98 1.98 1.98 1.98
Spain 2.95 3.29 3.29 3.29 3.29 3.29 3.62
Sweden 2.33 2.66 2.80 2.80 3.47 3.47 3.90
Switzerland 2.38 2.71 3.14 3.14 3.80 3.80 3.80
United Kingdom 2.70 3.04 3.04 3.04 3.57 3.57 3.57
subgroup mean 2.60 2.82 2.97 2.97 3.39 3.46 3.52
North America
Canada 2,76 2.76 2.76 2.76 2.76 2.76 2.76
United States 3.86 3.86 3.86 3.86 4.19 4.52 4.52
subgroup mean 3.31 3.31 3.31 3.31 3.48 3.64 3.64
Mean:
All above countries 2.68 2.87 3.01 3.01 3.40 3.47 3.53
111 countries 2.13 2.22 2.27 2.28 2.40 2.44 2.46





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1. Thenewterminator generecently developed jointlybyUSDA-ARS andDeltaandPine
Land Company, arid nowowned byMonsanto, could change theeconomics of bin-run
seed because it disrupts theability of a seed to reproduce itself. This could increase the
expected private return towheat varietal development, which has been anarea that the
private sector had largely dropped.
2. This is an example of the sometimes suggested linear anduni-directional relationship
from advances in science to advances in technology. Although this may be a good
representation for some ofthe advances inbiotechnology, it does not hold generally.
I return to this issue later in the paper.
3. In the United States and Canada, agricultural science policy developed longbefore
general science policy, and ithas continued to be separate (Schultz 1980; Huffman and
Evenson 1993; Guitard 1985).
4. The overall index is derivedby Ginarte and Park (1997) from five separate indexesfor:
(1) extent ofcoverage, (2) membership in international patent agreements, (3) provisions
for loss of protection, (4)enforcement mechanisms, and (5) duration ofprotection. For
example, loss ofprotection means 'working' requirements, compulsory licensing, and
revocation ofpatents. Duration is the share of20 years that a grantmg country gives
protection. Each of thefive components was given a value between 0 and 1bythe
authors for eachcoimtry andyear, anda country's patent-rights indexis the simimation
over these values, taking values between 0 and 5.
5. We can think of a fractionof currentagricultural research expenditure as being a net
addition to the social stockof knowledge capital or that some fraction of the pre-existing
stock of knowledge capital is replaced annually. Furthermore, because a significant share
of current research is redundant, gross expenditures arean inaccurate measure of net
additions to knowledge.
